The Great Deceiver

Young Earth Creationism is a belief that the world was made in six literal days and is less than 10,000 years old. Some versions of this belief apparently promote the notion that God created evidence of a universe that is 14 billion years old, of an Earth that is 4.5 billion years old, and of evolving life on this planet. But this was created purely for the reason of testing our ability to deny that evidence in favor of what this minority calls faith.

In The Language of God, Francis Collins addresses claims such as this patiently, though not without a hint of exasperation. He offers compelling evidence for the Big Bang, evolution, and God. He disputes this Creationist "image of God as a cosmic trickster." At least, he says, these Young Earth Creationists are now admitting the evidence. That's progress from a history of denying it. It is also, he says, perhaps "the ultimate admission of defeat for the Creationist perspective."*

This insistence that God must follow our own nostalgic perceptions of how a Creator behaves is somewhat baffling. I alternate between shrugging it off as another example of Christian nincompoopery and fuming over what it does to our collective witness. Presenting God as the prime deceiver seems blasphemous.

But this distorted view of God may help make sense of another source of bewilderment. I have lamented the church's penchant for lying. But if God deceives, then we, created in God's image, can (should?) embrace deceit. Endless deception can be viewed as evidence of godliness, not just a liability to be tolerated. If God deceives, so should we!

Does this explain how so many, in the name of truth, have embraced the lies? Might a Great Deceiver demand that we endorse "the country’s most accomplished trickster"** for the highest office in our land? 

Confession

It is reasonable to believe there is no god, that our universe is accidental. I believe I could believe that; many reasonable people do. But I would also have to give up other beliefs, beliefs that reasonable people who don’t believe in God still do believe in. Being reasonable, for example. In an accidental universe, being reasonable may be “nice” but it is not particularly rational. It is after all an accidental way of thinking, and by what standard is that way better than its opposite?

Atheist philosopher Daniel Dennett suggests we devote ourselves to a higher cause to be happy. You don’t need to believe in God; you can believe in Life. But is belief in life any more rational than belief in God? I can’t see my way to that line of reasoning.

I can't seem to see how belief in life, goodness, or truth is any more rational than belief in a god who encompasses these good things, and more. (Why settle for less?) Of course life is more easily verified than a god, so that's something. But I don't think that's what Dennett means. If that were the case, I could believe in rocks. That's not a higher cause. I think he means that we should view life itself as a higher cause, worthy of our devotion. That is to say, make a god of life.

I may, I suppose, want to devote myself to the higher cause of death, the great equalizer, rather than life. It is just as prevalent. Is devotion to one more reasonable than to the other? Life is nicer than death, to be sure. But what makes niceness sacred?

My view could be considered utilitarian. I refuse to believe in no purpose other than accident, no ultimate value of truth over a lack of it, no kindness more sensible than cruelty. If, in the end, it is only so many chemicals interacting, then where is purpose or meaning? If goodness is nothing more than sentimental claptrap, then it's more than I can bear. I’m not strong enough to deal with this head on. I admit some admiration for the deadly honesty of Nietzsche and others who have accepted this view, but I am not among them.

Why is it irrational to believe in a God who provides meaning, defines goodness, and requires kindness but OK to believe in meaning for meaning’s sake, kindness for kindness’ sake, and goodness for goodness’ sake? That too is ridiculous. I choose to be the other sort of ridiculous, one who believes in a reason for these things and a purpose in pursuing them.

And yet Dennett is onto something. Believe in life. Believe in nature. Believe in the truth about these. Believe in goodness. Believe in kindness. These are honorable. They may well be more honorable in God’s eyes than many of our own misconstrued perceptions of God and Jesus if through our beliefs we deny truth, and life, and goodness. (If you take Richard Rohr’s view of Christ, belief in life or nature is belief in Jesus.) Very often (though not always) naturalism comes without the serious downside of sanctimonious dogmatism that would destroy life and truth and kindness in its extremism. Is it possible that many who do not believe in a god believe in God more truly than many who make that claim?

The very act of reacting against the narrow-minded meanness of a history of religious people strikes me as spiritual (and therefore religious). It is a credit to those who see hypocrisy among religious folks as worse than for people who don’t give a damn. You are right: we ought to know better and care more! Pretty much the only people Jesus is recorded to have roundly criticized are the pious religious folks who thanked God that they were more godly than other people. It's quite the opposite, Jesus says.

And this is a lesson for those of us who insist you believe as we do: we may have it backwards. Your criticism of my faith for its vast history of cruelty and denial is, ironically, evidence to me of God’s mark—sensus divinitatis, in the words of John Calvin. If I am honest (and I believe I am called to be) I will admit that you may well have been closer to God all along. And my religiosity kept me from seeing you as God’s child, one closer to God than I am.